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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationships between Internet message-board activity and abnormal stock 
returns and between Internet message-board activity and abnormal trading volume.  This study focuses on 
RagingBull.com and Internet service sector stocks.  I choose RagingBull.com because its format enables 
me to measure investor opinion objectively.  I find that on days with abnormally high message activity 
changes in investor opinion correlate with abnormal industry-adjusted returns.  Additionally, days with 
abnormally high message activity coincide with abnormally high trading volume both that day and the 
following day.  However, I find that, in general, message-board activity does not predict industry-adjusted 
returns or abnormal trading volume.
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Introduction 
The Internet is clearly playing an ever-increasing role in financial markets and personal finance.  
Six large Internet brokerages, Ameritrade, DLJdirect, E*Trade, NDB, Schwab, and TD Waterhouse, 
cumulatively boasted over 12 million accounts in 1999 and are expecting account growth of 45% in 
2000.1  While the Internet revolution may have initially only facilitated security transactions, investors 
now benefit from a wide assortment of financial information available online.  All official SEC filings can 
easily be found on the World Wide Web.  Most established companies host web sites that provide 
investors with greater insight into management and long-term corporate strategies.  Moreover, the Internet 
has helped personal investors learn from others through open discussion in security-market forums.  Web 
sites like The Motley Fool (Fool.com), SiliconInvestor.com, and RagingBull.com have facilitated this 
discussion among thousands of investors. 
Valuation of Internet stocks is currently a hot topic in the academic community.  Trueman, Wong, 
and Zhang (2000), for example, try to find relationships between Internet company stock prices and 
accounting information.  In their research, they find a significant association between gross profits and 
valuation. Hand (2000) discovers a non-linear relationship between accounting data and stock pricing. In 
another paper, Rajgopal, Kotha, and Vehkatachalam (2000) find that web traffic helps determine the 
value of Internet companies, after controlling for some accounting measures.  Wysocki (1999) examines 
3,000 stocks listed on Yahoo! message boards and finds Internet message-posting volume predicts 
changes in next-day trading volume and returns.  Specifically, he finds that a doubling of overnight 
message postings relative to the average leads to a 0.18% average abnormal return. 
This research represents the first academic foray into Internet stock pricing.  These papers attempt 
to answer two key questions: (1) What are the determinants of Internet stock prices? and (2) Are these 
prices consistent with market efficiency?  The analysis presented in this paper is similar in spirit, but takes 
a very different perspective.  Instead of using accounting data, web traffic, or message-posting volume to 
determine value, this paper looks at the opinions contained in Internet financial forums.  Recently, the 
press has sensationalized the activity in these forums, linking it to egregious examples of stock-price 
manipulation.  For example, in February 1999, the stock price of a small Milwaukee-based toy company, 
Alottafun Inc., soared 382% based on speculation started in Internet chat rooms.2  In April 1999, a user of 
Yahoo! message boards posted a fraudulent Bloomberg.com press release that drove the stock price of 
PairGain Technologies up 31% in one morning.3  While these examples demonstrate the excesses of 
Internet-forum abuse, the vast majority of the discussion involves investors honestly expressing their 
opinions on securities markets. 
The analysis presented in this paper evaluates the relationship between Internet service company 
valuation and investor opinions quantitatively using a specific Internet forum, RagingBull.com.  This site 
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was selected not only because of its popularity, but also because it lets users post their opinions using a 
standardized message template, a feature that enhances the accuracy of message interpretation and 
analysis.  The messages on Ragingbull.com will be used to answer the following question: Can message 
board activity help predict stock returns and/or trading volume?  Message-board activity may help predict 
stock returns if a large number of investors follow the buy and sell recommendations of message board 
users.  Furthermore, day traders may recognize the momentum generated by investors that use message 
boards and create an inefficient increase in stock price.  Such a phenomenon may vary by sector and 
market capitalization.  While the analysis presented here will be very focused, it can easily be extended to 
any Internet forum and to any sector of the stock market.   
This paper presents both event study and a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis of the data.  The 
event study looks at abnormal stock returns and trading volume around days with abnormal message-
board activity.  For this study, event days are defined as days when the number of message postings 
exceeds the five-day average number of message postings by two standard deviations.  The results show 
that days with strong positive message board opinions are preceded by a small, abnormal increase in stock 
price.  Furthermore, message board opinion and abnormal returns on the event day are related.  However, 
there is little or no evidence that opinion predicts future returns. Trading volume increases significantly 
on the event day and generally remains high for one day thereafter.  The VAR analysis examines if daily 
returns, trading volume, the number of messages posted, and opinion can be used to predict these 
variables one-day in the future. Consistent with the results from the event study, in general, it is not 
possible to predict returns using any of the variables.  As is well known, trading volume is positively 
related to the previous day’s trading volume. Furthermore, trading volume, number of messages, and 
opinion help predict the next day’s number of message postings and the opinion in those messages.  
The paper first introduces Internet forums in greater detail so that the reader can understand the 
limitations created by analyzing a subset of financial forums.  The paper then turns to the RagingBull.com 
site specifically and discusses how the site’s configuration aids in accurate analysis of Internet discussion.  
The paper then presents descriptive statistics regarding the postings on RagingBull.com.  An event study 
examining the effect of message group discussion follows.  Finally, the paper will present a general VAR 
analysis of the data and draw conclusions regarding the quality of discussion in Internet forums.  
Overview  
Internet Financial Forums 
 Internet financial discussion forums can be divided into two main categories: chat rooms and 
bulletin boards.  Chat rooms are live forums in which participants discuss stock market developments.  
Patrons of Internet chat rooms are typically investors who wish to discuss “hot” stocks and transitory 
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market trends.  Chat rooms do not have historical archives of conversation and lack mechanisms by which 
an offline user can participate in the discussion.   
Bulletin boards provide organized forums for users to discuss specific financial instruments.  
Bulletin boards are not live forums, but instead allow users to post messages for retrieval by others at a 
later time.  A typical site contains distinct bulletin boards for each market security that users can discuss.  
A person wishing to search through previous messages may do so and reply to specific posts.  
  Both chat rooms and bulletin boards can be further subcategorized into public and private sites.  
While public sites draw from the largest number of users, private sites may be home to most of the wild 
stock speculation associated with the Internet.  Private sites are typical hosted by Internet personalities 
with large followings.  The users of private sites value the opinions of their hosts, with names like 
TokyoMex, WhizKid, and Lion Master, who have earned reputations for their ability to hype stocks on 
the Internet and create significant stock-price reactions.4  In fact, users of TokyoMex’s Society Anonyme 
web site pay $200 per year for access to his stock picks.5   
For this research, only public bulletin board forums are considered and only a single forum is 
analyzed.  Public bulletin boards are the only financial forums considered because only public bulletin 
boards make available a large enough volume of historical data for a true scientific study.  However, the 
use of public bulletin boards may introduce a bias into the study.  Because the private-board subscribers 
pay for the lead investor’s opinion, they may be willing to speculate on recommended stocks.  Public 
boards do not necessarily have investors whose opinion carries added weight.  The users of these boards 
may scrutinize other user’s opinions highly and be less likely to buy recommended stocks.  Therefore, 
while the analysis presented below will draw a relationship between bulletin-board messages and stock 
performance, the relationship may be different for private Internet financial forums. 
Sample Selection and Data Collection 
The Raging Bull Site 
It is difficult to understand the full scope of content available on the Internet.  Web sites are 
relatively easy to establish.  In fact, non-financial web “portals,” like Yahoo! and AOL, have created 
financial discussion groups to attract and retain users.  As financial discussion sites have proliferated, site 
format has been used as a means of differentiation.  Some sites categorize posts by sector, while others 
organize posts by stock ticker.  Still others group all messages into a single board and let users search for 
desired postings.  Therefore, it has become nearly impossible to understand and compare the full 
spectrum of thought on the web.   
For the purposes of this study, a single financial site, RagingBull.com, is used.  A single-site 
focus minimizes error by eliminating the need to group data from a variety of sources artificially.  
RagingBull.com is a leading Internet financial forum.  It is extremely popular, with a large membership 
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and a high number of page views per day.  Between April and November 1999, the site membership 
tripled in size to 300,000, while averaging 6 million daily page views.6 
 Bulletin boards are only as useful as their users make them.  As discussions in a particular board 
become off-topic, data relevant to an academic study becomes scarce.  Screening out these off-topic 
messages is very difficult and would likely introduce error as potentially valuable messages are thrown 
out.  Additionally, deciphering these messages can be very difficult.  In some cases, postings do not 
explicitly state the user’s opinion on a particular stock.  Without this information, it is difficult to create a 
metric of user’s opinions.  The RagingBull.com site minimizes these errors because of its configuration.  
First, all bulletin boards are categorized by ticker symbol.  This feature reduces the number of unrelated 
posts present in the study.  Second, the site includes an “optional disclosure” feature.  This feature is 
unique to the RagingBull.com site and lets users clearly indicate their opinion on the short and long-term 
prospects of the stock.  Using radio buttons, RagingBull.com members can select from a number of preset 
stock opinions.  They can select from long, short, or no position as their voluntary disclosure opinion.  
Similarly, users can issue strong buy, buy, hold, sell and strong sell ratings for both the short-term and the 
long-term.  The screen capture in Figure 1 illustrates the message-posting system on RagingBull. These 
features make the RagingBull.com site attractive from an academic point of view, because the site 
eliminates the need to screen and decode messages.  Of the 181,633 messages downloaded for this study, 
43,794 (24.1%) had short-term opinions, 37,810 (20.8%) had long-term opinions, and 52,812 (29.1%) had 
a general “voluntary disclosure.”  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 Source http://www.tokyojoe.com/  
6 Raging Bull press release, November 16, 1999, http://www.ragingbull.com/community/press/11-16-99.html 
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Figure 1 : Screen Capture from RagingBull.com 
 
The Internet Service Sector 
 Popular conception holds that bulletin-board opinions can greatly affect the prices of Internet 
stocks.  It is possible that investors, trying to find sources of trading momentum in a volatile sector, use 
message boards to find the next “hot” stock. To evaluate this belief, only Internet companies were used in 
this analysis. Zacks’ Internet Services sector group was used to find an unbiased selection of 73 Internet 
service companies (see Table 1). This group not only includes well-known, large capitalization companies 
like Yahoo! and Prodigy, but also includes many small-capitalization, obscure firms.  The sample sector 
had a median market capitalization of $1.12 billion as of January 11, 2000.  The minimum market 
capitalization was $53.1 million (Biznessonline.com), while the maximum market capitalization was 
$114.8 billion (Yahoo!).  A histogram demonstrating a relatively normal distribution of logarithmic 
market capitalization is shown in Figure 2. 
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Table 1 : Market Capitalizations and Start Dates for the Firms in the Sample 
Ticker Company Market Cap 
($Billion) 
First 
Message 
Ticker Company Market Cap 
($Billion) 
First 
Message 
AKAM Akamai Tech 26.11 11/2/99 ISLD Digital Island 3.33 7/1/99 
ASKJ Ask Jeeves Inc 2.99 7/6/99 ITRA Intraware Inc 1.69 4/19/99 
ATHM At Home Corp 15.26 4/19/99 ITVU Intervu Inc 1.38 4/19/99 
ATHY AppliedTheory 0.52 5/5/99 JFAX JFAX.com 0.2 7/27/99 
BFRE Be Free Inc 1.98 11/11/99 JPTR Jupiter Comm 0.39 10/12/99 
BIZZ Biznessonline 0.05  JWEB Juno Online 
Services 
1.32 5/28/99 
CAIS Cais Internet 0.75 5/24/99 KOREA Korea Thrunet  11/22/99 
CBLT Cobalt Grp Inc 0.38 8/9/99 LFMN Lifeminders.com 0.88 11/23/99 
CGLD Cybergold Inc 0.32 9/27/99 MAIL Mail.com Inc 0.74 6/22/99 
CLAI Claimsnet.com 0.06 4/19/99 MMXI Media Metrix 0.89 5/11/99 
CLKS Click2learn.com 0.16 4/19/99 NAVI Navisite Inc 2.57 10/26/99 
CMGI CMGI Inc 37.69 4/19/99 NBCI NBC Internet 4.36 12/2/99 
COVD Covad Comm Grp 5.6 4/19/99 NCNT Netcentives Inc 1.86 10/18/99 
CPTH Critical Path 3.21 4/27/99 NETZ Netzee Inc 0.31 11/23/99 
CTCH Commtouch 
Software 
0.52 7/15/99 NSOL Network 
Solutions 
7.51 4/19/99 
CYBS CyberSource Cp 1.17 6/28/99 NTCR Netcreations 0.57 11/23/99 
CYCH Cybercash Inc 0.19 4/19/99 NZRO NetZero Ince 2.7 9/28/99 
DCLK Doubleclick Inc 11.24 4/19/99 ONEM Onemain.com 0.36 4/19/99 
DDDC Deltathree.com 0.85 11/26/99 ORCC Online 
Res&Comm 
0.16 6/8/99 
DGIN Digital Insight 0.49 10/7/99 PASA Quepasa.com 0.15 6/29/99 
DIGI Digital Impact 0.98 11/26/99 PCNTF Pacific Internet 0.9 4/23/99 
DIGX Digex Inc 3.92 8/3/99 PILT Pilot Network 0.38 4/19/99 
DRTN Data Return Corp. 1.77 11/1/99 PRGY Prodigy Comm 1.48 4/19/99 
ELNK Earthlink Network 1.42  PSIX Psinet Inc 4.71 4/19/99 
ENGA Engage Tech 4.05 7/22/99 PXCM Proxicom Inc 2.42 4/26/99 
ENON Euro909.com 0.28 4/19/99 SCNT Scient Corp 4.95 5/18/99 
EXDS Exodus Comm Inc 17.73 4/19/99 SOFN Softnet Systems  0.44 4/19/99 
FLAS Flashnet Comm 0.11 4/19/99 TFSM 24/7 Media Inc 1.08 4/19/99 
FSHP Freeshop.com 0.51 9/30/99 TGLO TheGlobe.com 0.23 4/19/99 
GBIX Globix Corp 1.56 4/19/99 USIX USInterNetworki
ng 
2.79 4/19/99 
GEEK Internet America 0.09 4/19/99 VOYN Voyager.Net 0.35 7/23/99 
HEAR Hearme 0.65 5/4/99 VRIO Verio Inc 4.65 4/19/99 
HSAC High Speed Access 0.99 6/8/99 WGAT Worldgate Comm 0.94 4/20/99 
IGLD Internet Gold 0.39 8/10/99 XACT Exactis.com 0.29 11/23/99 
IIJI Internet Init 4.84 8/6/99 YHOO Yahoo! Inc 114.8 4/19/99 
INAP Internap Network 5.17 10/1/99 ZIPL Ziplink Inc 0.2 5/28/99 
INIT Interliant Inc 1.61 7/12/99     
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Figure 2 : Histogram of Market Capitalization for the Firms in the Sample 
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Data Collection 
 Data was collected from RagingBull.com using a PERL script. For each message on the site, the 
script recorded the stock ticker of interest, the date of the post, the body of the message, and the short, 
medium, and long-term opinion of the investor.  This data was immediately fed into a SQL database for 
data aggregation and analysis.  Message data was available on the weekend and after market close each 
day. Occasionally, message data was available before a company’s IPO.  The date of the first message 
posting for each ticker is listed in Table 1. Data was collected from April 17, 1999, the day when the 
opinion-disclosure feature was added to RagingBull, until February 18, 2000.  A total of 181,633 
messages were downloaded, with 10,723 unique ticker-day combinations.  In addition, stock return and 
volume data was extracted from the Internet, with 13,023 unique ticker-day combinations. 
Message Board Statistics 
 
Daily Average of Messages Posted  
 The average number of daily message postings was computed for each stock’s message board.  
Averages were computed between the first day with a message and February 18, 2000.  The mean stock 
message board had an average of 7.6 messages posted daily, while the median message board had 2.5 
messages posted daily.  The maximum average number of daily postings was 103.6 (CMGI Inc.).  A 
histogram showing the distribution of average daily message postings is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 : Histogram of Average Daily Message Postings for the Firms in the Sample 
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The scatter plot below shows that daily average message postings and market capitalization are, at best, 
loosely correlated.  Regressing the two variables using a log-linear relationship yields: 
 
log (Average Message Postings) = 0.4298 + 0.4072*log(Market Cap) 
R2 = 21.93%  
Figure 4 : Scatter Plot of Market Cap against Posting Average for the Firms in the Sample 
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Average Short-Term Opinion 
 Messages that included a voluntary short-term opinion were used to calculate an average opinion 
measure for each message board.  Messages with short-term strong-buy recommendations were assigned 
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a value of +2.  Similarly, messages with short-term buy, hold, sell, and strong-sell recommendations were 
assigned values of +1, 0, -1, and –2, respectively.  These opinion values were averaged on a daily basis to 
calculate the daily average opinion.  For all average daily average opinion calculations, days without 
opinions were ignored. 
 For each ticker, the average daily average opinion was computed.  The mean average daily 
average opinion was 1.56, while the median was 1.64.  These figures represent average opinions between 
buy and strong buy.  The standard deviation of the average daily average opinion was 0.287. A histogram 
showing the distribution of average daily average opinions is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5 : Histogram of Average Daily Average Opinion for the Firms in the Sample 
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Weighted Short-Term Opinion 
 Weighted opinions for each ticker were also calculated on a daily basis.  Each message with a 
short-term opinion was assigned a value according to the scale presented in the average opinion section. 
These opinions were added to calculate the daily weighted opinion.  This daily weighted opinion was 
averaged for each stock.  The mean average daily weighted opinion was 6.09, while the median was 3.44.  
The standard deviation of the average daily weighted opinion value was 9.49.  The maximum was 56.64 
(CMGI Inc.) while the minimum was 1.14 (TheGlobe.com). A histogram showing the distribution of 
average daily weighted opinions is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 : Histogram of the Average Daily Weighted Opinion for the Firms in the Sample 
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Stock Returns 
 The arithmetic average and standard deviation of daily returns were calculated for each stock 
during the sample period.  The mean arithmetic average of daily return for the stocks was 0.677% and the 
median was 0.648%.  The maximum average daily return was 2.53% (Be Free Inc) and the minimum was 
-0.58% (Flashnet Communications).  The average standard devia tion of daily returns was 7.59% and the 
median was 7.39%.  The maximum standard deviation was 13.37% (Cobalt Group) and the minimum was 
4.80% (Cybercash).  Both the average return and standard deviation of returns are very high compared to 
average values in the stock market during the sample period.  At the time of the study, the Internet sector 
was very volatile and generated exceptional ex-post performance.  Histograms showing the distribution of 
average arithmetic daily returns and the distribution of the standard deviation of daily returns are shown 
in Figures 7 and 8, respectively. 
Figure 7 : Histogram of Average Daily Returns for the Firms in the Sample 
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Figure 8 : Histogram of Return Volatility for the Firms in the Sample 
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Trading Volume 
 During the sample period, the mean average trading volume was 857,000 shares and the median 
was 423,000 shares.  The highest average daily trading volume was 8,765,000 shares (Yahoo!) and the 
minimum average daily trading volume was 75,000 shares (Claimsnet.com).  A histogram showing the 
distribution of average daily trading volume is shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9 : Histogram of Average Trading Volume for the Firms in the Sample 
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Event Study Analysis 
Overview 
An event study was conducted to determine the impact of high-message-volume days on 
securities prices and trading volume (Brown and Warner (1985); see also Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 
(1997) for a review of event study methodologies).  The study looks at industry-adjusted returns and 
abnormal volume around days with abnormally high numbers of postings. 
For each day in the sample period, the average and standard deviation of daily message postings 
over the previous five days was computed.  Event days were defined as those with message postings that 
exceeded the previous five-day average by at least two five-day standard deviations.  Event days in which 
fewer than 10 messages were posted were excluded from the sample.  This was done to reduce error 
introduced by stocks with small bulletin board followings.  
 
Event-Day Classification 
Two opinion metrics were examined to determine the strength of opinion changes on the event 
day.  The first opinion metric, the raw change in weighted opinion, was calculated as the difference 
between the event-day weighted opinion and the average weighted opinion over the previous five days.  
The second opinion metric, the adjusted change in weighted opinion, was calculated as the raw change in 
weighted opinion divided by the standard deviation of weighted opinion over the previous five days. 
The event study found a total of 293 event days.  47 of these had opinions lower than the previous 
five-day average.  These days were grouped into the “Negatives” category in the analysis.  5 of these 
event days had opinion equal to the previous five-day average and were ignored.  241 of the event day 
opinions were greater than the previous five-day opinion average.  These events were split in half.  The 
“strong positives” category contained the half of the event days with the strongest opinion change.  The 
“weak positives” contained the remaining event days, i.e., those with the weakest positive opinion 
change. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the changes in opinion on the event days. 
Table 2 : Descriptive Statistics for Investor Opinion on Event Days 
 Raw Change in Weighted Opinion Adjusted Change in Weighted Opinion 
Group Strong Positives 
Weak 
Positives Negatives 
Strong 
Positives 
Weak 
Positives Negatives 
Average 
Value 27.97 3.11 -2.85 1.57 0.70 -0.76 
Maximum 177.60 6.00 -0.33 2.00 1.14 -0.08 
Minimum 6.00 0.25 -12.00 1.18 0.08 -1.81 
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Calculating Abnormal Returns 
 Adjustment of daily returns is necessary because of the high and volatile returns in this sector.  A 
constant-mean-return model could be used to adjust returns, but many of the stocks in the study do not 
have enough data to calculate accurate historical mean returns.  Adjusting returns using the CAPM and 
the S&P 500 as the market index is another possibility.  However, beta calculations using the S&P 500 
would have large errors due to the volatility of the stocks.  Moreover, the CAPM may not be the correct 
model for normal returns of firms in the Internet sector.  The final option, adjusting returns using an 
industry index, is both feasible and free of estimation error because beta estimates are not needed. 
To find the correct index, an equally weighted portfolio of the 73 sample stocks was constructed.  
Daily returns for this portfolio were compared to the daily returns of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange 
Internet Index, the Amex Internet Index, the Chicago Board Options Exchange Internet Index, the 
Philadelphia Stock Exchange Semiconductor Index, the NASDAQ Composite Index, and the S&P 500 
Index.  The correlations between these portfolios are given in Table 3. 
The equally weighted portfolio is highly correlated with all three Internet indices.  In addition, the 
three Internet indices are highly correlated to one another. The PSE Internet Index has a correlation 
coefficient of 0.906 and 0.934 with the AMEX Internet Index and the CBOE Internet Index, respectively.  
The correlation coefficient between the AMEX and the CBOE Internet Index is also high, 0.920.  The 
PSE’s Internet Index was the most highly correlated with the equally weighted portfolio returns and was 
chosen as the industry index for the study.  The adjusted-return calculations should be insensitive to 
which of the Internet indices is used because of the high correlation between indices. As expected, the 
equally weighted portfolio was not as correlated with the market indices as it was with the Internet 
indices. 
Returns were adjusted for industry returns.  Each ticker was assumed to have a beta of 1 relative 
to the Philadelphia Stock Exchange Internet Index.  Therefore, industry adjusted return was defined as a 
stock’s daily return less the return on the Internet Index. 
Table 3 : Correlations between Candidate Indices and the Sample Portfolio 
 Equally 
Weighted 
Portfolio 
Internet 
Index (PSE) 
Internet 
Index 
(AMEX) 
Internet 
Index 
(CBOE) 
Semiconduct
or Index 
(PSE) 
NASDAQ 
composite  
Internet 
Index (PSE) 0.849     
 
 
 
Internet 
Index 
(AMEX) 
0.791 0.906     
Internet 
Index 
(CBOE) 
0.820 0.934 0.920    
Semiconduct
or Index 
(PSE) 
0.400 0.454 0.586 0.455   
NASDAQ 
Composite 
Index 
0.690 0.789 0.903 0.775 0.743 
 
 
 
S&P 500    
Index 0.524 0.585 0.715 0.574 0.622 0.838 
 14
 
Abnormal Trading Volume Calculations 
 Abnormal trading volume, which is defined as the percentage change in trading volume on a 
given day compared to the average trading volume, was computed for each ticker and each day during the 
sample period.  A 20-trading-day period preceding the day in question was used to calculate the average 
trading volume.  
 
Empirical Results 
 Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13 show the industry-adjusted returns and abnormal volume for a five-day 
period surrounding the event day. It is apparent that only strong-positive-opinion events classified using 
the raw change in weighted opinion show a statistically significant positive drift up to the event day (see 
Figure 10).  Returns for weak-positive-opinion events are statistically flat leading up to the event day.  
Negative-opinion event days seem to show a downward drift up to the event day, but the phenomenon is 
not statistically significant.  On the event day, both strong and weak positives have statistically 
significant, positive industry-adjusted returns (see Figures 10 and 11).  Negative-opinion event days have 
a slightly negative industry-adjusted return, which is not statistically significant.  Returns for all the 
opinion groups are statistically flat after the event day.   
 Similarly, trading volume is normal leading up to the event day.  On and one day after the event 
day, there is a sharp increase in trading volume (see Figures 12 and 13).  The strongly positive raw 
change in weighted-opinion group shows the most significant increase in trading volume.  For that group, 
approximately 160% more shares are exchanged on the event day than on the previous 20 days.  Trading 
volume retreats to more normal levels approximately two days past the event day.   
 The results show that message board activity is linked to stock price movements.  However, 
abnormal message board activity does not help predict future stock price movements over a one-day or 
five-day window in the future.  Each event day classification showed statistically insignificant changes in 
value after the event-day.  This observation is consistent with market efficiency.  On the event day, 
strong-positive and weak-positive event days showed statistically significant returns in excess of the 
industry index.  Therefore, abnormal message-board activity is coincident with abnormal stock returns.  
Using this methodology, it is impossible to determine whether activity on the message boards causes or is 
the result of abnormal returns on the stock.  Under market efficiency, message board activity may respond 
to abnormal stock returns. However, it is possible that the phenomenon represents market inefficiency.  
Message postings may influence stock prices as investors try to find momentum indicators on Internet 
message boards.  Further study examining the intra-day relationship between message posts and stock 
returns would be necessary to determine causality. 
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Figure 10: Abnormal Returns Around the Event Day
(Categorized by Raw Weighted Opinion) 
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Key: 
«« - Denotes 95% confidence that return is statistically different from 0. 
««« - Denotes 99% confidence that return is statistically different from 0. 
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Figure 11 : Abnormal Returns Around the Event Day
(Categorized by Adjusted Weighted Opinion)
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Key: 
«« - Denotes 95% confidence that return is statistically different from 0. 
««« - Denotes 99% confidence that return is statistically different from 0. 
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Figure 12 : Abnormal Trading Volume Around the Event Day
(Categorized by Raw Weighted Opinion)
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Standard Error 7.4% 7.0% 4.5% 6.3% 6.8% 65.9% 12.6% 5.7% 7.3% 10.1% 8.6% 
Strong 
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Key: 
«« - Denotes 95% confidence that return is statistically different from 0. 
««« - Denotes 99% confidence that return is statistically different from 0.
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Day  -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Abnormal 
Volume -3.5% -6.8% -11.6% -5.7% -1.1% 110.7% 34.3% -4.9% 0.6% 7.2% -1.0% 
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Key: 
«« - Denotes 95% confidence that return is statist ically different from 0. 
««« - Denotes 99% confidence that return is statistically different from 0. 
Figure 13 : Abnormal Trading Volume Around the Event Day
(Categorized by Adjusted Weighted Opinion)  
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VAR Analysis 
Overview 
A VAR analysis was performed to analyze the general relationship among stock returns, trading 
volume, message postings, and weighted opinion.  The analysis was performed on a stock-by-stock basis 
rather than over a pooled sample of all the stocks due to potential non-stationarity across securities.  
Specifically, since trading volume, number of messages, and weighted opinion differ in scale across 
stocks, there is no reason to believe that VAR coefficients should be the same across stocks. The 
alternative approach of normalizing these variables was rejected due to problems in formulating the 
correct normalization. Stocks with less than 30 observations were also eliminated from the data set.  
Rather than examining the coefficients themselves, t-statistics were calculated, again to avoid 
interpretation problems associated with scale effects. 
 
Specification 
 Define the vector of variables of interest on day t as follows: 
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Then, the corresponding VAR(1) model is: 
11 ++ ++= ttt BZAZ e  
where A is a vector constant, B is a four by four matrix, and e is the error term.  A, B and their 
associated standard errors were calculated on a stock-by-stock basis using ordinary least squares 
regression. 
 
Empirical Results 
 The average and median t-statistics across stocks for each coefficient are shown in the Tables 4 
and 5, respectively.  Meaningful average t-statistics are in bold text. These represent coefficients for 
which a significant fraction of the individual t-statistics are significant at conventional levels. The 
magnitudes of the t-statistics for the majority of coefficients are not meaningful.  Stock returns, trading 
volume, number of messages, and weighted opinion were not useful in predicting stock returns one day 
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into the future.  This result is consistent with market efficiency.  Trading volume shows an auto-
regressive relationship.  High trading volume days tended to precede days of high trading volume; low 
trading volume days tended to precede days of low trading volume.  The number of messages posted on a 
given day on RagingBull.com is highly dependent on the number of messages posted on the previous day.  
In addition, days with high trading volume and positive weighted opinions are followed by days with 
greater message activity.  Finally, weighted opinion is dependent on the number of messages and opinions 
posted on the previous day.  Positive opinion days tend to follow days with positive opinions.  The 
dependency of weighted opinion on the number of messages posted is consistent with the simple 
summation method used to calculate weighted opinion and the observation that each message board had 
positive average daily weighted opinions.  
 
Table 4 : Average T-Statistic 
  Independent Variable 
  Return Trading Volume 
# of 
Messages 
Weighted 
Opinion 
Return -0.275 -0.076 0.112 -0.069 
Trading 
Volume 0.064 
3.933 0.480 0.213 
# of 
Messages -0.395 0.855 2.203 1.082 
De
pe
nd
en
t 
Va
ri
ab
le
 
Weighted 
Opinion 0.251 0.279 1.825 0.929 
 
Table 5 : Median T-Statistic 
  Independent Variable 
  Return Trading Volume 
# of 
Messages 
Weighted 
Opinion 
Return -0.161 0.006 0.043 -0.045 
Trading 
Volume -0.084 3.703 0.180 0.097 
# of 
Messages -0.486 
0.778 2.121 0.581 
De
pe
nd
en
t 
Va
ri
ab
le
 
Weighted 
Opinion -0.036 0.123 
1.154 0.962 
Note: Bold text denotes statistically significant results.
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Conclusion 
 
It is fast becoming a truism that changes in information technology are ushering in a new age and, 
with it, a new economy. Although the larger implications of this are still being worked out, it is clear that 
Internet stocks are now, and will continue to be, a fundamentally important part of the financial 
landscape. Having recognized the importance of Internet stocks, financial theorists are now re-tooling 
their models to incorporate how financial markets value Internet companies. A number of valuable studies 
have begun this process by quantifying the effect of some accounting datum or other on Internet-stock 
valuation.  This paper extends recent academic research by examining the effects of postings and opinions 
found on Internet message boards. 
The VAR analysis shows that, in general, the returns of Internet service sector stocks are not 
predictable using message-board data and a linear one-day lagged time-series model.  This observation is 
consistent with market efficiency.  Instead, it is possible to predict the number of messages posted on 
Internet financial forums using the previous day’s trading volume, number of messages posted, and 
weighted opinion.  The event study shows that returns following abnormal Internet message-board 
activity are statistically insignificant and consistent with market efficiency.  However, statistically 
significant positive returns precede the days with strong positive opinions and abnormal message board 
activity.  Furthermore, stock returns and message-board opinions on days of abnormal message-board 
activity appear to be related.  While this observation may be consistent with market efficiency, additional 
research is needed to see if this relationship reflects a market inefficiency and if changes in opinions 
precede movements in stock price.    
These results are significant because they counter the conventional wisdom that Internet service 
stocks are valued irrationally.  In general, message-board activity and opinion do not appear to impact 
stock prices in a significant, industry-adjusted fashion.  Furthermore, abnormal message-board activity 
does not appear to predict significant abnormal returns.  Therefore, the evidence presented in this paper 
shows that valuation of Internet service stocks is reasonable and consistent with market efficiency. 
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